Risk Management is often an overlooked aspect of any Cybersecurity program, however, without it, the potential of a major incident increases. The challenges associated with risk management are figuring out how to identify, prioritize, track, and mitigate risk. This paper will explore a framework of managing risk by utilizing an open source program called SimpleRisk. A case study involving GIAC Enterprises, will explain the features and advantages of using such a tool to manage risk.
Introduction
Risk Management has evolved just like many other aspects of IT Security. Risk management, or threat modeling, requires a methodical approach or framework. In Adam Shostack's new book, Threat Modeling: Designing for Security, he introduced a way to look at threats by focusing on four key questions: "What are you building? What can go wrong? What should you do about those things that can go wrong? Did you do a decent job of analysis?" (Shostack, 2014, p. 5) .
While this may seem like a simple concept, identifying, managing, and more important, mitigating risk is where IT Security professionals truly earn their keep. In their book, Managing Cybersecurity Resources: A Cost-Benefit Analysis , Lawrence Gordon and Martin Loeb point out, "given the unpredictable nature of breaches, cybersecurity decisions are often based on gut instinct rather than sound economic analysis" (Gordon, 2006) . Gut instincts are not enough to combat the many challenges presented by the sophisticated threat actors in today's world.
Risk management is an integral part of project management. Project risk management is one of 10 key project management knowledge areas as defined by the Project Management Institute. As outlined in the Project Management Body of Knowledge PMBOK Guide, 5 th Ed., "Risk Management is the process of defining how to conduct risk management activities for a project. The key benefit of this process is that it ensures that the degree, type, and visibility of risk management are commensurate with the risks and the importance of the project to the organization." (A Guide to the Project Management Body of Knowledge, 2013, p. 467) . This paper will explore the concepts of risk management, introduce SimpleRisk open source framework, and finally, illustrate the power of SimpleRisk through a detailed case study involving GIAC Enterprises.
Risk Management Concepts
The most recent zero-day Internet Explorer vulnerability affecting versions of IE dating back to version 6.0 immediately received the attention of Microsoft when Adrienne Hall, General Manager, Microsoft Trustworthy Computing stated, "The security of our products is something we take incredibly seriously. When we saw the first reports about this vulnerability we decided to fix it, fix it fast, and fix it for all our customers" (Zeltzer, 2014) .
What security professional has not heard of or been affected by the recent Heartbleed OpenSSL cryptographic library vulnerability that allows attackers to invisibly read sensitive data from a web server? This was a big deal as it was estimated that approximately 66% of the Internet or two-thirds of the web servers could be using this software (Powledge, 2014) .
Adobe Flash is always an exploit vector as they again just had to release an emergency update amid new zero day drive-by attacks (Goodin, 2014) .
The few examples just mentioned provide the Threat Actors with plenty of ammunition in which to focus their attacks.
Risk Management Cycle
Now that risk has been defined with the relationship between assets, threats, and vulnerabilities, it is important to recognize the risk management cycle. As mentioned, risks first need to be Identified. This can be based on a vulnerability scanning, management review of process and procedures, type of assets and potential vectors of exploits based on operating system and applications that are being used. Next, the need to Assess the risk based on the likelihood, impact and potential loss of reputation or goodwill or associated costs. The next key point is Mitigation, or taking the steps to reduce risk to an acceptable level. Risk cannot be mitigated if it has not been identified or understood. Risks can be avoided, transferred, mitigated, or just plainly accepted. The Monitor & Report step is to help management perform reviews and access the progress of risk mitigation projects defined and implemented in the mitigation step.
Of course, this is a continual cycle of circling back to identify potentially new, or the evolution of current risks. The Risk Management Cycle is illustrated below:
SimpleRisk
SimpleRisk was developed by Josh Sokol, who ran into many barriers and budget constraints in regards to tools to manage risk. Very few companies can afford the expensive IT Governance, Risk and Compliance (GRC) tool sets that can assist an analyst in managing risk.
However, as pointed out by Michael Rasmussen, President of Corporate Integrity, "People are doing IT GRC whether they are calling it that or not, but they are document-centric [solutions], using spreadsheets and other documents. Spreadsheets are a recipe for disaster. Eventually, they outgrow this; they don't have proper audit trails and it becomes unmanageable" (Roiter, 2011 
SimpleRisk Configuration
Once SimpleRisk is installed, there are configuration settings that may need to be made.
Here are the configuration options:
Configure Risk Formula
The Configure Risk Formula configuration option provides a means to define the nature of risk. By default, High Risk is defined to be anything greater than 7. Medium Risk to be less than above (High Risk), but greater than 4. Low Risk is defined to be less than above (Medium Risk), but greater than 0. These can be changed if the need warrants. The chart below defines 
Configure Risk Settings
The Configure Risk Settings option determines the number of days High, Medium, or
Low risks are reviewed. The defaults are shown in the screenshot below.
Add and Remove Values
The 
User Management
The User Management option allows the SimpleRisk admin to create users with very specific roles. For example, the admin could define users that are only allowed to submit a new risk, modify existing risks, close risks, plan mitigations, review low/medium/high risks, or allow access to "Configure" menu. Certain roles can also be assigned based on teams(s) assignments.
For example, an admin on the Network team could be assigned the responsibility to review and/or specific mitigate risks. Auditors are very keen on the separation of duties as Kevin Coleman, Technolytics Institute pointed out, "Separation of duties is a key concept of internal controls and is the most difficult and sometimes the most costly one to achieve. This objective is achieved by disseminating the tasks and associated privileges for a specific security process among multiple people" (Coleman, 2008) .
Redefine Naming Conventions
The Redefine Naming Conventions provides a means of redefining the meaning of Impact, Likelihood, and Mitigation Effort. For example, under Impact, a risk manager might want to change 'Insignificant' to 'Trivial'.
Audit Trail
The Audit Trail option is pretty self-explanatory. It keeps a detailed audit trail of all actions taken while working in SimpleRisk.
Extras
The Extras option provides premium add-ons to the core SimpleRisk platform which enhances and provides more functionality. The cost is reasonable and offers a perpetual license:
! Cost authentication extra: Currently provides support for Active Directory Authentication and Duo Security multi-factor authentication, but will have other custom authentication types in the future. ! Team-Based Separation: Restriction of risk viewing to team members the risk is categorized as. ! Notification: Sends email notifications when risks are submitted, updated, mitigated, or reviewed and may be run on a schedule to notify users of risks in the Unreviewed or Past-due state. ! Encrypted Database: Encryption of sensitive text fields in the database.
Announcements
The Announcements option provides the latest information related to SimpleRisk development and extra enhancement options.
About
The About option provides version information and informs admins when a new update is available along with a download link. Josh also provides a means of supporting his effort and earning some much needed karma.
SimpleRisk Case Study

Background
GIAC Enterprise (GIAC-E) is a small to medium-sized growing company. It employees 900 workers, including a small group of business and IT workers at corporate HQ, with the rest of the remote workforce distributed worldwide. They also have various support contracts in place to assist with day-to-day help desk, and commodity security products such as antivirus/anti-malware. The company is the largest supplier of fortune cookies scripts or proverbs in the world and prides itself on a rich history as well as cutting edge original research. The current primary product of GIAC-E is the content of the fortunes themselves, i.e., the data. Data is handled at corporate headquarters.
GIAC-E current infrastructure services include the data center, networking, and central services such as Oracle and Exchange back ends. A firewall is deployed with a standard DMZ and Internal segments. Otherwise, the network is flat. This model has worked well for years so there is no real incentive to change this model. Like many other fledging businesses, GIAC-E employs minimal security practices and has no centralized security group. They do not see the need to spend a large percentage of their scarce resources on security since the current configuration seems to be doing a fine job. IDS/IPS is not deployed considering all workstations have anti-virus installed. Patching is spotty since it is the responsibility of the individual user to maintain their equipment.
Due to the competitive nature of the fortune cookie business, it is critical for GIAC-E to look for other means of distributing the fortunes. The tried and true method of having the cookies distributed from a central datacenter is no longer sufficient. By having all the data in one location also introduces additional risks associated with potential denial of service attacks or data lose due to sophisticated hacker attacks.
Research and development has continued to refine the development of fortune cookie sayings and have developed a propriety algorithm that has incorporated the explosion of social media. They have also developed the design of a fortune telling machine and its associated manufacturing process. This is the edge they need to stay a step ahead of their competition.
Unfortunately, security was not integrated in the development/testing phases.
To their shock and surprise, GIAC-E's main competitor, Golden Dragon Fortunes, LLC, just announced a fortune telling machine that looked almost identical to their own. Not only that, the fortunes themselves showed characteristics of the new fortune-saying generation algorithm.
How could this have happened since this was such a top secret project? Was GIAC-E compromised? So many questions with so few answers.
Identifying Risks
GIAC-E had never experienced a security breach like this before and did not have the inhouse expertise to deal with such an incident. They immediately hired an external consultant, Security HD, Inc., to assist them. Security-HD, Inc. prides themselves in documenting and managing risks. They have integrated SimpleRisk to assist them in managing the risks exposed during the breach root cause analysis and after action report.
After a thorough investigation of the incident, Security-HD, Inc. identified the following risks that contributed to the breach:
1. GIAC-E.com website was discovered to have 12 Medium, and two High vulnerabilities including:
a. Cross-Site Request Forgery vulnerability was discovered that allowed remote attackers to hijack the authentication of administrators.
b. Multiple SQL injection vulnerabilities were discovered that allowed remote attackers to execute arbitrary SQL commands.
Lack of Log review on web server:
a. Log review is not taking place on web server or the platform operating system enabling the breach to go unnoticed.
3. Lack of review of data on website:
a. Information on website listed key GIAC-E personnel, thus providing the opportunity for social engineering attacks.
Employees had no IT Security training:
a. Lack of basic IT Security awareness training left employees more susceptible to social engineering attacks.
Lack of Network Access Control:
a. An imposter from Golden Dragon Fortunes posed as a vendor. During a bathroom break, the vendor plugged a laptop into the internal network and sent an internal memo posing as the CEO to all employees containing a malicious link to a Blackhole exploit kit server's landing page.
6. Key administrative account was compromised via social engineering/crafted spear phishing attack:
a. Publically accessible information about GIAC-E was gathered. A key administrator was identified and a targeted spear phishing email was sent that contained a malicious attachment.
7. Third-Party access restrictions not enforced:
a. GIAC-E had a contract with a Third-Party vendor that helped develop the hardware for the new fortune teller machines at their Research Park location. A key engineer's account was compromised which allowed full and unrestricted access to GIAC-E's internal development network.
8. Remote Access did not require two-factor authentication:
a. An employee's password (which did not have a lockout mechanism after a set number of unsuccessful logins) was cracked and used to VPN into the protected network.
9. Recently terminated employee account was not immediately removed from the server:
a. Logs indicated this employee account was accessed from Golden Dragon Fortunes network space.
10. IDS/IPS was not installed:
a. Data breach was effective by installing malware on the file server via phishing attack. This process went unnoticed for months due to the lack of IDS.
Lack of Incident Response:
a. The GIAC-E IT staff was at a loss of what to do when they were notified of a possible data breach. They decided to keep it quiet so they did not get in trouble. This lasted for six weeks until the true nature of the breach was revealed.
Lack of Mobile Device Policy:
a. GIAC-E deployed new Android tablets to key employees for testing the new fortune cookie generation algorithm via a new app. Employees were not properly trained on the proper use of mobile devices and downloaded source code for the new app and stored it on their mobile device for review at home. Tablet was stolen and did not have full-disk encryption.
Security-HD, Inc. could easily have found additional risks but realized that they had a good starting point. By identifying these risks, GIAC-E will now be able start to mitigate them, thus helping to protect their critical intellectual property.
Document Identified Risks using SimpleRisk
Security-HD, Inc. opened up SimpleRisk and realized that there is a need to add some values in order for fully document GIAC-E's corporation by clicking on the Configuration | Add and Remove Values tab and proceeded to add the following values:
• Technology: Account Management, Authentication, IDS/IPS, Encryption, Logging • Team: Remote and Mobile Users, Content Management • Location: GIAC-E Headquarters, Remote Sites, Research Park Security-HD, Inc. proceeded to enter the risks identified. Here is an example of the entry screen in SimpleRisk as shown in the screenshot below:
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Robert Sorensen, rssoren@gmail.com Security-HD, Inc. proceeded to input the remaining risks. SimpleRisk provides multiple ways to score risk to include the Classic, CVSS, DREAD, and OWASP methodology. Risk calculations can be somewhat subjective and that each scoring calculator derives scores differently. Most risks were scored by the classic model, but Risks 1a, 5a, and 8a were scored using the CVSS score method (first.org). Risk 6a was scored using the DREAD model (cisodesk.com). Finally, Risk 1b was scored using the OWASP method (owasp.org).
SimpleRisk comes with built-in calculators to assist in determining risk scores as shown in the example below using the SimpleRisk CVSS V2.0 Calculator:
SimpleRisk provides a comprehensive report that shows all risk scoring methods and the risks scored using each. Select Reporting | All Open Risks by Scoring Method option as shown in the screenshot below:
Manage/Mitigate Identified Risks using SimpleRisk
Now that the risks have been identified, it is time to come up with a game plan to manage and/or mitigate them. SimpleRisk sorts mitigation prioritization based on risk score. This provides a list of submitted risks that require mitigation planning. To show this list, click on
Risk Management | Plan Your Mitigation as shown below:
Security-HD, Inc. determines that there is a patch available for the Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) and SQL injection vulnerability associated with the website and can be mitigated quickly at a minimal cost. By clicking 'No' under Mitigation Planned for ID 1001, it leads them to the Submit Mitigation page. They submit their planned mitigation as shown below:
After the mitigation is accepted, Security-HD, Inc. then goes to the Perform Management Review phase where risk ID 1001 is reviewed with management. This is done by clicking the 'No' link under the Management Review column. The risk was approved and the next step, 'Submit as a Production Issue' was selected with directions to the sys admins to apply the patch as soon as possible.
It did not take the sys admins long to apply the patch and verify that the risk was resolved. Security-HD, Inc. proceeded to close this task by clicking 'id link 1001'. From here, 'Close Risk' was selected from the drop down Risk Actions menu.
Since the patch was applied, under the Reason drop down menu, 'Fully Mitigated' was selected and the patch date was entered in the Close-Out Information box as shown.
Each risk was reviewed, Approved or Rejected, and the next steps were considered (Accept Until Next Review, Submit as a Production Issue, or Consider for Project) as shown in the Reporting | Management Reviews by Date report below:
Based on the remaining risks, Security-HD, Inc. recommends GIAC-E implement four projects. These projects will vastly improve their overall security program and help detect and reduce future compromises. Without proper IDS/IPS, it was difficult to determine the exact cause of the compromise. Also, without a formal Incident Response program, GIAC-E was not prepared to detect an intrusion much less be able to contain and mitigate it in a timely manner.
After digging deep into logs and reviewing the mobile device configuration, Security-HD, Inc.
determined that the major breach was a result of lack of two-factor authentication on compromised accounts and the lack of encryption of sensitive data on their mobile devices.
Thus, the projects shown in Reporting | All Open Risks Considered for Projects by Risk Level
were entered. ! Management Reviews by Date ! Projects and Risks Assigned This is a very comprehensive set of reports that can be used to manage an enterprise risk program. In addition to the reports available, an Audit Trail is generated for every action performed for each risk. For example, ID 1001 shows that the following actions have occurred for this risk to include closing the task (this is a very beneficial feature of SimpleRisk, one that auditors will love.):
Maintenance of SimpleRisk
SimpleRisk is a great open source project for managing risk. One thing that is missing from the program is the ability to backup and restore the MySQL database. This could be critical, especially before upgrading SimpleRisk.
Backup/Restore SimpleRisk MySQL Database
A few simple scripts can accomplish this task easily. The first script will perform a backup of the MySQL database created for SimpleRisk. -rw-rw-r--1 risky risky 58329 May 26 21:25 /home/risky/backups/simplerisk-backup_2014-05-26_2125.sql risky@vb-riskyb:~/bin$ Another script will be needed in order to restore the database. There may be multiple backups, so this script will present a menu of the available backups from which to select and restore the database. #!/bin/bash #$HOME/bin/sr_restore #Define variables backupdir=$HOME/backups
.Select a backup to restore: ' select i in `ls -l $backupdir/*.sql | awk '{ print $9 }'` do echo -e "" #PS3="Select a backup to restore: " hs="//`echo $i | awk -F, ' {print $1 }'`/`echo $i | awk -F, ' { print $2 }'|sed 's/+/ /g'`"
bfile=$i echo -e "Restoring backup $i...\n" echo -e "MySQL root password -\c" mysql -u root -p simplerisk < $bfile exit done
Here is an example of running this script: 
Upgrade SimpleRisk
Periodically, Josh provides an update to SimpleRisk. He has provided documentation on how to perform the upgrade (Sokol) . Here is a quick overview of the steps: 
Conclusions
Appendix A -NIST Special Publication 800-30 Revision 1-Taxonomy of Threat Sources
Type of Threat Sources Description Characteristics
Individuals, groups, organizations, or states that seek to exploit the organization's dependence on cyber resources (i.e., information in electronic form, information and communications technologies, and the communications and information-handling capabilities provided by those technologies). Natural disasters and failures of critical infrastructures on which the organization depends, but which are outside the control of the organization. Note: Natural and man-made disasters can also be characterized in terms of their severity and/or duration. However, because the threat source and the threat event are strongly identified, severity and duration can be included in the description of the threat event (e.g., Category 5 hurricane causes extensive damage to the facilities housing missioncritical systems, making those systems unavailable for three weeks). Adversary uses commercial or free software to scan organizational perimeters to obtain a better understanding of the information technology infrastructure and improve the ability to launch successful attacks. ( Perform network sniffing of exposed networks. ( Adversary with access to exposed wired or wireless data channels used to transmit information, uses network sniffing to identify components, resources, and protections. ( Adversary corrupts or inserts malware into common freeware, shareware or commercial information technology products. Adversary is not targeting specific organizations, simply looking for entry points into internal organizational information systems. Note that this is particularly a concern for mobile applications. (
Range of effects
Appendix B -NIST Special Publication 800-30 Revision 1-Representative Examples -Adversarial Threat Events
Insert targeted malware into organizational information systems and information system components. (
Adversary inserts malware into organizational information systems and information system components (e.g., commercial information technology products), specifically targeted to the hardware, software, and firmware used by organizations (based on knowledge Exploit poorly configured or unauthorized information systems exposed to the Internet. ( Adversary gains access through the Internet to information systems that are not authorized for Internet connectivity or that do not meet organizational configuration requirements. ( Exploit split tunneling. ( Adversary takes advantage of external organizational or personal information systems (e.g., laptop computers at remote locations) that are simultaneously connected securely to organizational information systems or networks and to nonsecure remote connections. ( Exploit multi-tenancy in a cloud environment. ( Adversary, with processes running in an organizationally-used cloud environment, takes advantage of multi-tenancy to observe behavior of organizational processes, acquire organizational information, or interfere with the timely or correct functioning of organizational processes. ( (   Adversary,  operating  outside  organizational systems, intercepts/eavesdrops on sessions between organizational and external systems. Adversary then relays messages between organizational and external systems, making them believe that they are talking directly to each other over a private connection, when in fact the entire communication is controlled by the adversary. Such attacks are of particular concern for organizational use of community, hybrid, and public clouds. ( Adversary targets key organizational employees by placing malware on their personally owned information systems and devices (e.g., laptop/notebook computers, personal digital assistants, smart phones). The intent is to take advantage of any instances where employees use personal information systems or devices to handle critical/sensitive information. ( Conduct supply chain attacks targeting and exploiting critical hardware, software, or firmware. ( Adversary targets and compromises the operation of software (e.g., through malware injections), firmware, and hardware that performs critical functions for organizations. This is largely accomplished as supply chain attacks on both commercial offthe-shelf and custom information systems and components. (  Achieve results (i.e., cause adverse 
impacts, obtain information) (
Obtain sensitive information through network sniffing of external networks. ( Adversary with access to exposed wired or wireless data channels that organizations (or organizational personnel) use to transmit information (e.g., kiosks, public wireless networks) intercepts Adversary destroys or causes deterioration of critical information system components to impede or eliminate organizational ability to carry out missions or business functions. Detection of this action is not a concern. ( Cause integrity loss by creating, deleting, and/or modifying data on publicly accessible information systems (e.g., web defacement). ( Adversary contaminates organizational information systems (including devices and networks) by causing them to handle information of a classification/sensitivity for which they have not been authorized. The information is exposed to individuals who are not authorized access to such information, and the information system, device, or network is unavailable while the spill is investigated and mitigated. ( 
